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THE EXPANDING USE OF GENETIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE: FINDING
COHERENCE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW?
Michael Vitiello*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine criminal defense attorneys accepting a court appointment to
represent a defendant facing capital charges. Even if the evidence of guilt is not
overwhelming, they will begin building their case in mitigation as part of the
anticipated penalty phase of the trial.1 The penalty phase gives the parties broad
discretion in introducing evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors about
the defendant.2 Although the Supreme Court has never held that the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution requires states to allow juries to
balance mitigating evidence against aggravating factors,3 the Court has held
that, once states create such systems, they must grant the offender wide latitude
in introducing such mitigating evidence.4 Competent attorneys have routinely
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;
University of Pennsylvania, J.D. 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A. 1969. I want to extend
special thanks to my colleague Jerry Caplan, and my former colleagues Joshua Dressler and
Michael Hoffheimer, and Fordham Professor Deborah Denno for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article. In addition, I want to extend thanks to Jerry Caplan for leading
a workshop on this paper and to my colleagues who attended that presentation and
specifically to Raquel Aldana, Mary-Beth Moylan, and Emily Garcia Uhrig for their
comments at the presentation. Also, I want to thank McGeorge students Erika Lewis and
Jacquelyn Loyd for their help with footnoting the article, and to Jacquelyn Loyd for her
research assistance and coordination of work on the footnotes.
1 LINDA E. CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 75 (3d ed. 2012). All
jurisdictions that authorize the death penalty require two trials: the first deciding the question
of guilt or innocence and the second beginning only after a judge or jury finds the defendant
guilty of an offense punishable by death. This is known as the bifurcated trial. Id.
2 In fact, randomness and ‘freakishness’ are even more evident in a system that requires aggra-
vating factors to be found in great detail, since it permits sentencers to accord different treatment,
for whatever mitigating reasons they wish, not only to two different murderers, but to two mur-
derers whose crimes have been found to be of similar gravity.
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 666–67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). The American Law
Institute was an early proponent of the balancing process of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors but, largely in recognition of the arbitrariness of the process, the Institute withdrew its
support for Model Penal Code § 210.6 in 2009. See Cary Bricker & Michael Vitiello, Chi-
nese Homicide Law, Irrationality, and Incremental Change, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J.
43, 57, 59 (2013).
3 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 53–54, 131. In fact, the Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment sets limits to the introduction of aggravating evidence and “must provide a basis
for an individualized decision that death is appropriate for th[e] defendant.” Id. at 131.
4 Id. at 174. “[V]irtually all proffered mitigating evidence relating to the defendant’s charac-
ter, record or crime is ‘relevant’ and, thus, . . . admissible.” Id.
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relied on scientific evidence focusing on environmental factors5 that reduce the
offender’s culpability. In recent years, neuroscience6 and genetic information7
have gained increasing acceptance in the death penalty phase,8 adding to infor-
mation about the influence of an offender’s dysfunctional upbringing.9 In an
impressive study of over eighty criminal cases involving behavioral genetic
evidence, Professor Deborah Denno found a trend towards greater judicial
acceptance of such evidence, especially in death penalty cases.10
Perhaps surprisingly, Professor Denno found in the cases she reviewed
that prosecutors typically did not attempt to use similar genetic evidence to
prove future dangerousness.11 Instead, as with information about the offender’s
upbringing and other environmental information, behavioral genetic informa-
tion is used almost exclusively to attempt to reduce an offender’s culpability.12
After all, if one’s family has a history of antisocial behavior caused by those
family members’ genetic makeup, presumably we are less likely to blame the
offender.
Many death penalty opponents no doubt applaud the expansion of the use
of such material to lessen the likelihood of the imposition of the death pen-
alty.13 But the use of such information begs additional questions. The argument
that genetics and environmental factors reduce an offender’s culpability is a
powerful one, the implications of which need to be explored. Currently, reli-
ance on behavioral genetic and environmental information is primarily limited
to death penalty cases, not other criminal cases.14 Analytically, however,
because information showing an offender’s genetic predisposition to criminal-
ity and with a horrible upbringing of abuse and neglect reduces an offender’s
culpability, one should ask why such evidence is not important at a criminal
sentencing hearing or the trial itself. Framed differently, as courts routinely
5 By environmental, I mean evidence of abuse and other evidence about the offender’s
upbringing that may explain the offender’s ability to commit a heinous crime. See, e.g.,
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309–10 (1989); Detrich v. Ryan, 619 F.3d 1038, 1047–48
(9th Cir. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011); Worthington v. Roper, 631
F.3d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 2011).
6 See Full Definition of “neuroscience,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/neuroscience (last visited Apr. 24, 2014) (defining neuroscience as “a
branch . . . of the life sciences that deals with the anatomy, physiology, biochemistry, or
molecular biology of nerves and nervous tissue and especially with their relation to behavior
and learning”).
7 Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in
Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 998 (2011)
(indicating that behavioral genetics evidence can be grouped into four types: “(1) expert
testimony, (2) family history, (3) behavioral history, and (4) medical history”).
8 Id. at 1028.
9 See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 309–10; Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1047–48; Russell v. Collins,
998 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (5th Cir. 1993).
10 Denno, supra note 7, at 1028.
11 Id. at 974. Speculating why prosecutors have not done so is beyond the scope of this
article.
12 Id.
13 Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 379, 379–80 (2006) (criticizing the court’s use of scientific studies but applauding
its result).
14 See infra Part II.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ317.txt unknown Seq: 3  4-JUN-14 10:17
Summer 2014] GENETIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 899
accept such evidence in death penalty cases, are they likely also to allow the
use of such evidence in other contexts where they would seemingly have equal
applicability?
These are the questions on which this article focuses. Section II reviews
the use of evidence about how the brain works in death penalty cases and
develops in more depth why such evidence is relevant.15 Section III examines
an area outside the death penalty where the Supreme Court has relied on studies
about psychological development to find that the Eighth Amendment prevents
the imposition of a term of life without the benefit of parole on an offender who
was under eighteen years old when he committed his offense and who has not
committed homicide,16 and then has extended that to juvenile offenders who
have committed murder. Specifically, it held that a state may not mandate life
without the benefit of parole for all juvenile murders.17 In Graham v. Florida
and Miller v. Alabama, the Court relied on information derived from such stud-
ies to support its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.18 Section IV looks
beyond Graham and Miller and examines how the Court views the Eighth
Amendment in criminal sentencing cases generally.19 Elsewhere, the Court has
given states wide latitude in setting criminal punishments when the punishment
is a term of years and the case does not involve a juvenile offender.20 Further,
the Court has seldom suggested that the Constitution requires states to take
such scientific evidence into consideration in deciding what substantive
defenses to allow. For example, the Court has not held that states must allow a
particular substantive defense, like insanity, even though modern scientific evi-
dence might support an argument that an offender suffering from mental illness
cannot conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.21 That section also
explores whether the current state of the law, which, in effect, forces states to
comply with modern scientific studies in two limited contexts but not else-
where, is consistent. Despite a powerful argument that the same line of thought
that prevailed in the death penalty and juvenile punishment contexts should
apply with equal force elsewhere in the law, Section IV further explores why
the Court is not likely to extend the same reasoning to those areas of the law.
This is the case because, at its core, the criminal law is grounded in the idea
that offenders have free will to choose whether to commit crimes.22 Psycholog-
ical evidence, which focuses on causes of human behavior, is inconsistent with
that premise. That section also explores the reality of the criminal law: the
criminal law often compromises consistency and coherency when protection of
the public requires abandoning principle.
15 See infra Part II.
16 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
17 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
18 See infra Part III.
19 See infra Part IV.
20 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michi-
gan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
21 See infra pp. 19–22.
22 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 (2d ed. 2008).
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II. THE SCIENCE OF THE BRAIN AND THE LAW
Back to the hypothetical criminal defense lawyers who have just been
appointed to represent a client charged with capital murder. When they begin to
piece together the facts of the crime, they may discover truly gruesome facts.
Here is a not-so-hypothetical example of what they may learn:
Prior to committing two murders and leaving a third victim near death, the
defendant spent the day with a friend. The pair injected cocaine and drank a
large quantity of beer. Later, they found a pornographic magazine and took
turns reading it. During the early afternoon, the defendant returned to the apart-
ment complex where he and the victims lived. He forced his way into his
neighbors’ apartment and began making sexual advances towards his first vic-
tim, the single mother of two young children. When she resisted, the defendant
became violent. Grabbing a butcher’s knife, the defendant stabbed the woman
repeatedly, splattering blood all over the apartment. The autopsy report listed
over eighty wounds, many of them defensive wounds. No single wound was
fatal, suggesting that the victim suffered for a long time as the defendant
assaulted her.
Her daughter, two years old, was found near her mother’s body on the
kitchen floor. She was also dead. Her autopsy listed wounds from the butcher’s
knife to her chest, abdomen, back, and head. The only surviving victim was a
three year-old son of the first victim. He was found with multiple stab wounds
and had lost most of the blood in his body. Surgeons were able to save his life
by performing surgery, lasting over five hours.
Reading further, the defendant’s attorneys discover that evidence of the
defendant’s guilt is overwhelming.23
Faced with a prosecutor unlikely to agree to a plea deal for a sentence
other than death, the attorneys must chart their strategy. Competent death pen-
alty lawyers know what they must do: they must build a powerful case for
mitigation that is likely to be built on a combination of witnesses from the
defendant’s childhood who can testify about the horrible experience of the
defendant’s life and experts who can explain the psychological impact that
those experiences had on his life.24 In more recent years, they might also
develop a behavioral genetic history.25
What is that personal history likely to reveal? Anyone familiar with death
penalty cases knows the common denominators that appear in the life stories of
offenders who have committed heinous crimes, which qualify them as the worst
of the worst.26 Begin with horrendously abusive families, parents who commit
23 With a few minor modifications, these are the facts of Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
811–13 (1991). As I have argued elsewhere, the Supreme Court no doubt took certiorari in
Payne in order to overrule very recent precedent. See Michael Vitiello, Payne v. Tennessee:
A “Stunning Ipse Dixit”, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 165, 167 (1994). While
the facts are truly gruesome, anyone familiar with death penalty litigation knows that they
are hardly unique.
24 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 169–70.
25 Denno, supra note 7, at 974.
26 See CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976)).
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unthinkable acts of violence towards their children.27 These offenders are often
shunted from home to home with stepparents or other caretakers who seem to
resent their existence.28 Their parents often abuse alcohol and drugs29 and may
leave their children without adequate care while they go on binges.30 Parents
may also allow others to abuse their children31 and may, themselves, have
extensive experience with the criminal justice system.32 Brain injuries are com-
mon among offenders who end up on death row,33 leading some experts to
speculate that such physical trauma is a major cause of violence among death
row inmates.34 Such offenders often suffer from other problems, including
retardation,35 alcoholism36 and drug addiction,37 paranoia, and other mental
illnesses.38
For those unfamiliar with modern death penalty law, one might ask what
such facts have to do with the imposition of the death penalty. That has to do
with the current administration of the death penalty in states that allow the
death penalty. At one point in our history, premeditation was the dividing line
between offenders who might receive the death penalty and those who were
27 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309–10 (1989) (indicating that the mentally
handicapped defendant Penry’s mother had abused him as a child); Detrich v. Ryan, 619
F.3d 1038, 1047–48 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the defendant, alleged to have stabbed the
victim over forty times, had an abusive childhood at the hands of several stepparents); Rus-
sell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (5th Cir. 1993) (outlining the murder defendant’s
mitigating evidence, including a severe beating he received as a child in which his stepfather
hit him the face with a baseball bat).
28 Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1047–48 (explaining that Detrich lived with an abusive stepmother
before moving to his biological mother’s where he acquired an abusive stepfather). See gen-
erally Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death
Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999).
29 Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1047 (alcohol abuse); Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 493
(mother abused alcohol, father abused heroin); Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1048–49
(9th Cir. 2010) (alcohol and drug abuse).
30 Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1047 (noting even shockingly worse behavior can occur: Detrich’s
stepfather actually took him along on his drinking binges, and in one instance, the two of
them disappeared for days and ended up 300 miles from home).
31 Id. (describing the defendant’s abuse at the hands of two different stepparents).
32 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1410, 1425 (2011).
33 Jones v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2009); Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287,
1291–92 (5th Cir. 1993); Purkey v. United States, No. 06-8001, 2010 WL 4386532, at *6 n.1
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2010); Commonwealth v. Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869, 2010
Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *5–6 (C.P. Allegheny Cty., Crim. Div. May 13, 2010).
34 See generally Drew Barzman et al., Does Traumatic Brain Injury Cause Violence?, CUR-
RENT PSYCHIATRY, Apr. 2012, available at http://www.currentpsychiatry.com/articles/evi
dence-based-reviews/article/does-traumatic-brain-injury-cause-violence/cc8f09d62b5d5abc
023ea413a99617d2.html.
35 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 309 (1989); Williams, Nos. 200001876, 200002869,
2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 193, at *5–7.
36 Detrich, 619 F.3d at 1047; Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010);
Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 924 (6th Cir. 2007).
37 Hodges v. Bell, 548 F. Supp. 2d 485, 507 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
38 Morris v. Malfi, 449 F. App’x 686, 686 (9th Cir. 2011); Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d
487, 493 (8th Cir. 2011); Henry v. Ryan, No. CV 02-656-PHX, 2009 WL 692356, at *65 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 17, 2009);. See also Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d 1276, 1281 (Fla. 2009) (introducing
the defendant’s PET scan at trial, which showed low activity in certain areas of the brain
related to impulse control and judgment).
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statutorily ineligible.39 That is, in many states, first degree murder, a premedi-
tated murder,40 made the offender eligible for the death penalty, whereas a
second degree murderer would receive some term of years.41 Scholars found
premeditation a poor dividing line for those eligible for death as opposed to a
term of years in prison. Among other problems with the premeditation formula-
tion identified by the Model Penal Code drafters, the idea that a person who
plans ahead is more culpable than a person who does not is a generalization that
“does not . . . survive analysis.”42 For example, “[p]rior reflection may reveal
the uncertainties of a tortured conscience rather than exceptional depravity. . . .
The suddenness of the killing may simply reveal callousness so complete and
depravity so extreme that no hesitation is required.”43
While many members of the America Law Institute favored abolition of
the death penalty,44 the original Code included an alternative to the use of pre-
meditation or any other simple formula for dividing between murderers who
were and were not death eligible.45 For states that were going to impose the
death penalty, the Model Penal Code prescribed a set of aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances that should be balanced in determining whether the death
penalty was justified.46
The Supreme Court has never mandated that states follow this model.47
However, it has become de facto the law for states that retain the death pen-
alty.48 During the post-Furman49 era, the Supreme Court found constitutional
various state laws allowing the imposition of the death penalty.50 Many of them
39 See Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 57; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 (1962).
The Pennsylvania Act of 1794 limited capital murder to first-degree murder. There has
always been some confusion over whether murder committed by one of the specified
means–e.g., poison–must also be found “wilful, deliberate or premeditated” in order to sup-
port the capital sanction. Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 55.
40 Many jurisdictions have a second category of first degree murder, those cases in which a
death occurred during a particularly heinous felony. In such cases, premeditation is irrele-
vant. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 500–01 (6th ed. 2012).
41 Id. The Pennsylvania Act of 1794 provided that all murder, which shall be perpetrated by
“means of poison, or by lying in wait,” or by any kind of “willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing” shall be murder in the first degree; and all other kinds of murder shall be
deemed murder in the second degree. Id. at 501 (internal quotations omitted). Only first-
degree murder was capital. Id. at 500–01.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 4(b).
43 Id.
44 Id. § 210.6 cmt. 1.
45 Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 55–56 (discussing the critique of the line between
first and second degree murder).
46 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.6(1), 210.6(3).
47 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 172. Relevant mitigating evidence relates to the defen-
dant’s “character or record” or “the circumstances of the crime.” The Court has found that
aggravating circumstances must be adequately narrowed to the class of persons eligible for a
sentence of death. Id. at 140.
48 Id. at 139. Each of the thirty-four states that have death penalty statutes require a jury to
find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance or its functional equivalent. See Bricker
& Vitiello, supra note 2, at 45 (discussing the Model Penal Code).
49 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
50 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 139. The Court found the death penalty statutes of Geor-
gia and Florida, which enumerated aggravating circumstances, constitutional. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ317.txt unknown Seq: 7  4-JUN-14 10:17
Summer 2014] GENETIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 903
have adopted an approach based on § 210.6 of the Model Penal Code.51 As a
result, they allow the state and offender to introduce evidence relating to aggra-
vation or mitigation.52 In various holdings, the Supreme Court has protected
the right of the defendant to introduce a wide variety of mitigating evidence.53
This approach may have few supporters54 but, given the fact that this balancing
of mitigating and aggravating factors is so well established in the law, death
penalty attorneys have pushed to expand the kinds of evidence that the jurors
may consider in their deliberations.55
Mitigation evidence, like behavioral genetic information, psychological
evidence about the harm caused by abuse, and expert evidence about the effect
of brain trauma, is relevant because it tends to reduce the offender’s culpabil-
ity.56 That, of course, is the point of asking the jury to balance mitigating and
aggravating factors.57 Compare the following two offenders: one has grown up
in a stable loving environment and does not have any identifiable brain abnor-
mality; the other has been the victim of horrendous abuse, which has contrib-
uted to his inability to conform his conduct to the law. Each offender murders
someone. Surely, if the decision maker must decide who is more culpable, he or
she is likely to choose the privileged individual. One might object that an
examination of the background of the privileged individual would reveal miti-
gating evidence. Fair enough; but although one can raise many objections to
such a balancing approach,58 the idea is grounded on the notion that the set of
cards we are dealt, both environmental and genetic, influences our behavior and
ability to conform our conduct to the law. Even a strong proponent of free will
may recognize that some offenders have more difficulty conforming their con-
duct to the requirements of the law, in part, because of their genetic and envi-
ronmental backgrounds.
Even beyond holding that such mitigating evidence is admissible, in Roper
v. Simmons, the Supreme Court relied on scientific studies demonstrating that
adolescents are less able than adults to conform their conduct to the require-
51 Id. at 131 and accompanying notes (stating that some states have adopted statutory aggra-
vating evidence); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.6(1), 210.6(3).
52 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 172 (describing the “no preclusion” principle that allows
defendants to introduce mitigating evidence).
53 Id. at 169 (“The Court has held that almost all evidence proffered by the defense as
mitigating must be permitted in the penalty phase.”).
54 See Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 57. The American Law Institute considered a
provision allowing discretionary sentencing, but ultimately did not include it in the Model
Penal Code due to the propensity for abuse that comes with all discretionary standards.
Instead, the Institute suggested states adopt a guided discretionary standard. Id. See also
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1142 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia con-
curred to say that these discretionary principles “were invented without benefit of any textual
or historical support” and that personal moral convictions against the death penalty should
not be read into the Constitution. Id.
55 Denno, supra note 7, at 1028 (describing the court’s increasing acceptance of behavioral
evidence over the last few years).
56 Id. at 972.
57 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 169. Mitigation evidence enables the sentence to con-
sider the life and circumstances of the particular defendant in deciding whether death or life
is the appropriate sentence. Id.
58 See Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 57; see also text accompanying note 54.
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ments of the law to hold that certain punishments that are constitutional with
respect to adults are unconstitutional with respect to people under the age of
eighteen.59 One prominent scholar has criticized the Court’s analysis of that
data in Roper,60 largely on grounds that some of the support was dated and that
the Court read sources carelessly, using them for propositions somewhat differ-
ent from the authors’ points.61 Nonetheless, Roper is an example of where the
Court’s view of the Eighth Amendment has been influenced by an emerging
scientific understanding of the brain. Unclear is whether the view of any justice
who voted in the majority in Roper turned on modern scientific evidence; but
reliance on such data seems like a powerful rhetorical argument: the Court is no
longer relying solely on a subjective sense that adolescents lack the same
capacity for control as adults.
Thus, at least in the death penalty context, psychological and genetic evi-
dence influences the law in one of two ways. In cases where the offender
remains death penalty eligible, that offender may present that kind of evidence
in mitigation because it is relevant to the offender’s culpability. In Roper, the
Court relied on that kind of evidence to determine that a class of offenders is
not death penalty eligible in the first instance. In both instances, the evidence is
relevant because it demonstrates a lower degree of culpability.
III. GRAHAM, MILLER, AND BEYOND
As explored more fully below, members of the Court have often incanted
the mantra that “death is different” in discussing rules governing the death pen-
alty that may not apply elsewhere in the criminal law. But the Court extended
its holding in Roper to two other cases involving juvenile offenders.62 It did so,
in part, in reliance on the same scientific support it found compelling in
Roper.63
In Graham v. Florida,64 the Supreme Court resolved the following ques-
tion: does the Eighth Amendment prohibit a state from sentencing a juvenile
offender to a true life sentence for a non-homicide offense?65 The Court con-
cluded that such a sentence did violate the Eighth Amendment.66
Graham was obviously a deeply troubled youth, raised by drug addicts,
diagnosed with attention deficit disorder at an early age, using alcohol and
tobacco from age nine and marijuana from age thirteen.67 His violent criminal
career began at least as early as sixteen years old, when he and friends made a
botched armed robbery attempt.68 Despite a promise to the court to turn his life
around, Graham was involved in a serious home invasion robbery within
59 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
60 Denno, supra note 13, at 380.
61 Id.
62 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464
(2012).
63 See text accompanying note 59.
64 Graham, 560 U.S. at 48.
65 Id. at 52–53.
66 Id. at 82.
67 Id. at 53.
68 Id.
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months of his initial sentencing.69 Believing that Graham was incorrigible, the
trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole, rejecting even
the prosecutor’s recommended sentence of a term of years.70
The Graham majority recognized that Eighth Amendment case law has
fallen into two categories: instances in which a particular sentence may violate
the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality provision and those in which the
Court establishes categorical rules.71 The cases involving categorical rules, in
turn, involve two subsets of cases: cases in which certain offenses do not qual-
ify for the death penalty72 and cases in which a subset of offenders do not
qualify for the death penalty.73 Roper presented an instance in which the under-
lying crime, murder, qualified for the death penalty, but met the second crite-
rion whereby the Eighth Amendment prevents the execution of offenders who
were juveniles when they committed murder.74 Graham presented the Court
with a new subcategory: a categorical challenge to a term of years.75
Following analysis familiar from the death penalty context, the Court ana-
lyzed whether there exists a national consensus on the suitability of a particular
punishment.76 The Court concluded that the sentencing practice at issue was
“exceedingly rare.”77 More important for this discussion, the Court focused on
the culpability of the offender and of juvenile offenders generally.78 In reliance
on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan,79 the
majority examined “the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their
crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of punishment in ques-
tion.”80 In that discussion, the Court also assessed whether the state’s sentenc-
ing policy advanced legitimate penological goals.81
The Court’s conclusion followed naturally from Roper, which “estab-
lished that because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving
of the most severe punishments.”82 Further, as compared to adults, juveniles
had a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”83 As a
result, juveniles are not categorically among the worst offenders.84 The Court
relied on brain science as presented to the Court by Graham’s amici, including
briefs from the American Medical Association and the American Psychological
Association.85 The Court also found no compelling penological justification
69 Id. at 54.
70 Id. at 56–57.
71 Id. at 59.
72 Id. at 60–61.
73 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 578 (2005).
74 Id.
75 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61.
76 Id. at 62–67.
77 Id. at 67.
78 Id. at 62–67.
79 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67.
81 Id. at 67–75.
82 Id. at 68 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
83 Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
84 Id.
85 Id.
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that supported life without the benefit of parole for juvenile offenders.86 The
overall conclusion was clear: juveniles are less morally culpable than adults, in
part because of what brain science reveals.87
The juvenile offenders in Miller, which included the consolidated case,
Jackson v. Hobbs,88 were fourteen when they committed their crimes. Both
juveniles were charged with murder, for which they were sentenced to life
without benefit of parole.89 Thus, the Court had to decide whether to extend
Roper and Graham.
It did so. Initially, the majority relied on the essential holding in both cases
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentenc-
ing.”90 They are less culpable and have greater capacity for reform than
adults.91 This line of cases has relied not only on common sense (“on what ‘any
parent knows’ ”92), “but on science and social science as well.”93
The Court has not distinguished between behavioral genetic studies and
other studies. Distinguishing between the different kinds of studies almost cer-
tainly would not matter because both types support the view that the capacity
for self-control develops over time and that youth is a particularly volatile
period.94
Roper, Graham, and Miller raise some interesting questions for purposes
of this article. There are several issues that seem to flow from those cases. First,
what is the underlying principle at work? For example, the Court’s reasoning in
Roper seemed to flow from death penalty cases where the Court has taken a
close look at proportionality, at least since 1976 when it decided Coker v.
Georgia.95 While Coker focused on the underlying crime, it held, in effect,96
the death penalty was proportional only if the defendant took a life.97 Roper
and cases like Atkins v. Virginia98 involved the death penalty and focused on
the offender, rather than the offense. Nonetheless, cases like Coker, Roper, and
Atkins seem to revolve around a single principle: the death penalty must be
proportional based on retributive grounds. Punishment is excessive if the state
86 Id. at 71.
87 Id. at 82.
88 Jackson v. Hobbs and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
89 Jackson and Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
90 Id. at 2464.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 That conclusion is supported by other data as well as scientific studies. Anyone familiar
with crime statistics knows that violent crime is a “young man’s game.” Michael Vitiello,
California’s Three Strikes and We’re Out: Was Judicial Activism California’s Best Hope?,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1097 n.581 (quoting Posner, J.). The peak crime years are
between 15 and 29. See id. at 1055.
95 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
96 Coker did not produce a majority opinion, but the plurality opinion was narrower than
Justices Brennan and Marshall’s view. As a result, the plurality’s holding could be cited as
having precedential value. More recent, a majority of the Court has made that explicit. Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426–30 (2008).
97 The Court has left open the question whether some offenses, perhaps treason, might jus-
tify the death penalty even absent the loss of life. See id. at 437 (choosing not to rule on state
crimes like treason).
98 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NVJ\14-3\NVJ317.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-JUN-14 10:17
Summer 2014] GENETIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 907
seeks to take a life when the offender did not take a life. Further, the offender
must be sufficiently culpable to warrant retribution even if he has taken a life.99
Blindly relying on the mantra that “death is different” does not explain
why the principle emerging from Coker through Roper should not be extended
further. This article takes up that question in the next section. Before leaving
Graham and Miller though, I want to observe the questions that those cases
seem to raise: Is death “different” or has the Court extended the principle that
culpability is essential to proportionality outside the area of the death penalty?
The obvious common denominator in Graham and Miller is the age of the
offenders. But that compels one final question. Why should those cases be lim-
ited to juvenile offenders? Why don’t they apply any time an offender can
show an absence of culpability resulting from causes beyond his control?
IV. STRUGGLING TO FIND THE PRINCIPLE
Assume that defense counsel represents two offenders, charged with unre-
lated murders. One is a youth, charged with killing an older man, who forced
the young man to have intercourse and then ridiculed him after the fact. Call
the first offender Mr. Camplin.100 The other is an older man from an ethnic
group known for their passionate nature. The second client learned that another
man insulted his wife. He became enraged and killed the other man. Call the
second offender Mr. Esaltato.101 Based on clear evidence that her clients com-
mitted the acts, she starts to investigate whether they may have successful prov-
ocation defenses.
She consults her scientific expert. He explains the most recent research,
both genetic and cultural, and tells her that young people do not have the same
capacity as do more mature adults.102 As a result, they have difficulty con-
forming their behavior to social norms. He also explains the existence of an
emerging body of literature that demonstrates ethnic differences in levels of
control.103 He mentions a recent study showing much higher alcohol addiction
rates among some ethnic groups than others.104 She now must determine if she
can use her expert at trial on the ground that her clients are less culpable than
offenders who are not youthful or not of this particular ethnic group. She is
99 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding that the defendants who were
major participants in a crime such that their actions showed a highly culpable mental state
could still be sentenced to death); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (holding that
the death penalty cannot be imposed on the defendants found guilty of felony murder
because they do not have a culpable enough state of mind).
100 These are the facts of DDP v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.) 712, in which the House
of Lords held that a fifteen year old is entitled to be judged by the standard of self-control
exhibited by youths of the same age when the issue is reducing a charge of murder to volun-
tary manslaughter.
101 Esaltato means “exalted,” “raised up,” or “hot headed” in Italian.
102 See supra Part II; Mara Rose Williams, Teens’ Brains Lack in Ability for Sound Judg-
ment, DAVIDVANALSTYNE.COM, http://www.davidvanalstyne.com/pg-teensbrainslack.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
103 Mara Rose Williams, Reckless Teen Acts May Start in Brain: Nerve Center Forms into
Adulthood, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 23, 2000, at A1. .
104
  See M. Reza Nakhaie et. al., Self Control and Social Control: An Examination of
Gender, Ethnicity, Class and Delinquency, 25 CANADIAN J. OF SOC. 35, 44 (2000).
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about to learn that the answers to those questions are maybe and it depends. As
discussed above, if Mr. Esaltato was charged with a capital offense, some of the
evidence would be relevant.105 Also as discussed above, the Supreme Court has
already found that sentencing Mr. Camplin to a true life sentence would violate
the Eighth Amendment.106 But what about in other instances?
Whether such evidence is relevant at sentencing is largely dependent on
state law. Outside the areas of the death penalty and the recent cases dealing
with true life sentences for juveniles, the Supreme Court has largely left sen-
tencing policies to the states. The body of case law dealing with terms of
imprisonment for adults is thin.
Prior to 1980, the Court paid little attention to the question. The one nota-
ble exception involved a defendant who was working for a public agency as a
disbursing agent and was convicted of falsifying documents in order to defraud
the government.107 He was sentenced to fifteen years “at cadena”108 by a Phil-
ippine court.109 The Court found that the sentence amounted to cruel and unu-
sual punishment.110 The Court did not make clear whether the fact that the
defendant would be subject to hard labor was necessary to its finding.111
Between 1980 and 2003, the Court decided a series of cases that stand for
the proposition that the Eighth Amendment includes a proportionality protec-
tion even when the sentence is a term of years, but that only in exceedingly rare
instances will a defendant prevail.112 A divided Court rejected the defendant’s
claim in Rummel v. Estelle113 in 1980. There, a Texas court sentenced a repeat
offender to a term of life in prison.114 Under Texas law, the prisoner was parole
eligible,115 and offenders like Rummel typically got out of prison in a relatively
short time.116 In dicta, the Court suggested that a term of imprisonment might
violate the Eighth Amendment but found no constitutional violation in Rum-
mel’s case.117
Two years later, the Court affirmed a forty-year sentence imposed on a
defendant charged with possession and possession with intent to distribute nine
ounces of marijuana.118 The Court issued a per curiam opinion, largely in reli-
105 See supra Part II.
106 See supra Part III.
107 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 357 (1910).
108 Id. at 356, 363 (defining “cadena” as a type of offense imposed on public officials who
falsify any information). Time served at cadena also entailed being chained and working at
hard labor. Id. at 364.
109 The Philippines was a US colony in 1910. Id. at 361 (referring to the government in
question as “The United States Government of the Philippine Islands”).
110 Id. at 380–81.
111 Id. at 381–82.
112 See infra notes 113–47.
113 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264–65 (1980).
114 Id. at 264.
115 Id. at 278.
116 But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (sentencing defendant to life without
parole caused the court to hold that the sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment).
117 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 283–84.
118 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–72 (1982) (per curiam).
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ance on Rummel.119 As in Rummel, the per curiam opinion stated that some
terms of imprisonment may be so grossly disproportionate that they would vio-
late the Eighth Amendment, but that such challenges would be exceedingly
rare.120
A year later, the Court found such a case. In Solem v. Helm, the Court held
that a true life sentence imposed on a repeat offender was grossly dispropor-
tionate.121 Like Rummel’s record, Helm’s prior record involved a succession of
relatively minor felonies.122 The Court stated that its precedent had established
proportionality review and that Rummel had reaffirmed it.123 No doubt in rec-
ognition that a broad reading of the Eighth Amendment might federalize large
numbers of state criminal sentences, the Court was explicit that legislatures
retain broad authority to determine appropriate punishments, and instances in
which a term of imprisonment might violate the Eighth Amendment would be
“exceedingly rare.”124 But in Helm’s case, the severity of the punishment far
outweighed the gravity of the harm posed by a criminal offense.125
By 1991, Justice Powell, the author of the majority opinion in Solem v.
Helm, had retired and was replaced by Justice Kennedy.126 Faced with a simi-
lar issue in Harmelin v. Michigan,127 the Court was deeply divided in a case
involving a true life sentence imposed on an offender convicted of possession
of more than 650 grams of cocaine.128 Writing the plurality opinion only for
himself and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia found that the Eighth
Amendment did not contain a proportionality principle when an offender was
sentenced to a term of years.129 Four dissenters found the case controlled by
Solem v. Helm.130 Writing for three justices, Justice Kennedy summarized what
has become the prevailing rule of law. He reaffirmed several legal propositions,
including the principle that a grossly disproportionate sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment.131 He also emphasized that a court must give substantial
deference to legislative determinations about proper sentences; that the Eighth
119 Id. at 370.
120 Id. at 374.
121 Solem, 463 U.S. at 303.
122 Id. at 279–80.
123 Id. at 288–89.
124 Id. at 289–90.
125 Id. at 290. The Court’s test focused on three steps. First, a court must assess the culpabil-
ity of the offender and the harm threatened to society from the offender’s conduct. Second, a
court should then do an intra-jurisdictional comparison whereby the court should compare
the kinds of offenders who received similar punishments in the same state. Third, a court
should conduct an inter-jurisdictional comparison of criminal sentences to see the kinds of
punishments meted out for similar defendants in other states. As would become clear when
the Court returned to the question in 1991, the Court did not indicate whether after address-
ing the first question, a court must go on to the second and third inquiries. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962, 965 (1991) (plurality opinion).
126 Justice Kennedy took his seat on the Court in 1988. Biographies of Current Justices of
the Supreme Court, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
(last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
127 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961–62.
128 Id. at 961. Harmelin possessed 672 grams of cocaine.
129 Id. at 961, 965.
130 Id. at 1027–28.
131 Id. at 996.
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Amendment does not adopt any particular penological theory; that differences
in sentencing are inevitable in a federal system; that a court must look to objec-
tive factors in determining whether a sentence is disproportionate; and that a
court will find an Eighth Amendment violation only if a term of imprisonment
is grossly disproportionate to the crime.132
Justice Kennedy departed from the dissent over whether a court must per-
form an inter-jurisdictional and intra-jurisdictional comparison of sentences in
every case.133 In Solem v. Helm, Justice Powell stated that a lower court “may”
conduct such a review.134 As a result, Justice Kennedy could argue that only if
a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed led to an infer-
ence of gross disproportionality should a court conduct the sentence compari-
sons.135 Finding that Harmelin’s crime was so serious and posed such a high
risk of harm to society, Justice Kennedy did not go further.136
In 2003, the Court revisited the proportionality issue in Ewing v. Califor-
nia.137 The defendant in that case, Ewing, had a long criminal history, similar
to the defendants in cases like Rummel v. Estelle and Solem v. Helm.138
Charged under California’s Three Strikes law,139 Ewing’s third felony was a
theft offense.140 He received a term of imprisonment of twenty-five-years-to-
life.141
As in Harmelin, the Ewing Court lacked a majority opinion. Justices
Scalia and Thomas argued that the Eighth Amendment does not extend to terms
of imprisonment.142 Justice O’Connor’s three-person plurality reaffirmed Jus-
tice Kennedy’s approach in Harmelin.143 The plurality upheld Ewing’s twenty-
five-year-to-life sentence for several reasons. Justice O’Connor found legiti-
mate the state’s interest in increasing punishment for repeat offenders and cited
traditional deference to state legislatures in making rational policy choices. She
underscored that Ewing’s punishment was for a career of crime, not simply for
this third strike.144 But, “[e]ven standing alone, Ewing’s theft should not be
taken lightly.”145 The plurality suggested that a twenty-five-year sentence is not
132 Id. at 997–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 999–1000.
134 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
135 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
136 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (pointing out that the Court has looked before to societal
norms when evaluating whether or not a sentence is cruel and unusual). By not going further
in the analysis, Justice Kennedy avoided analysis of Harmelin’s best argument: his sentence
was truly unusual at that time, even in the height of the war on drugs.
137 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003) (plurality opinion).
138 Id. at 18. Prior to stealing some golf clubs and being sentenced to twenty-five-years-to-
life under California’s Three Strikes law, Ewing had been convicted of various forms of
theft, including grand theft auto, as well as battery, burglary, robbery, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm. Id. at 18–20. He was on parole when he
committed the theft that led to his life sentence. Id.
139 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170 (West 2013).
140 Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion).
141 Id. at 20.
142 Id. at 31–32 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Thomas, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 14–32.
144 Id. at 29.
145 Id. at 28.
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so long that it creates a presumption of gross disproportionality that would
compel examination of intra- and inter-jurisdictional comparisons.146
Four justices dissented and found that the case violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.147 For them, the question was squarely within Solem.148 While four dis-
senters and three justices who joined the plurality agreed that the Eighth
Amendment includes a proportionality principle in cases involving terms of
imprisonment, the principle is not a very robust one. Until Graham and Miller,
Solem was the Court’s only decision overturning a term of imprison, at least in
the modern era.149
Think back to my hypothetical defense attorney representing Camplin and
Esaltato. Even if she amasses a good bit of evidence that they are less culpable
because of their youth in Camplin’s case or temperament in Esaltato’s case, is
that evidence relevant to a court’s determination of an appropriate sentence if
the court is considering a term of years, instead of the death penalty or life
without benefit of parole in the case of the juvenile offender? The answer is
almost certainly “no” based on any plausible Eighth Amendment argument.
At the outset, many sentencing schemes allow consideration of the age of
the offender, with an offender’s youth being a mitigating factor,150 and a vari-
ety of other factors, including employment history, family history and the
like.151 But it does not follow that the Constitution requires consideration of
such factors; the Supreme Court suggests that the answer to the question
whether the age of the offender, employment history, and the list of other miti-
gating factors are constitutionally mandated is no.
Solem, Harmelin, and Ewing are clear: the Eighth Amendment does not
prescribe any particular penological goal; states are free to pursue any goal that
they choose.152 Even after Graham and Miller, the Court will find a sentence
grossly disproportionate only in the rarest of instances.153
To underscore how much latitude states have in determining their goals
for sentencing, imagine my hypothetical defense attorney arguing on behalf of
her clients Camplin and Esaltato. She seeks to introduce evidence at their sen-
tencing hearings to demonstrate that their culpability is less than that of other
offenders. Camplin’s youth makes him less capable of conforming his behavior
to social norms than do adult offenders; Esaltato’s inherited disposition makes
him less capable than offenders who are not of the same ethnic background.
146 Id. at 23.
147 Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined Justice
Steven’s dissent.
148 Id. at 37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 358 (1910). As indicated above, whether Weems
turned on the form of punishment—“cadena”—is not clear.
150 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 645 (1990); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 107 (1982).
151 See, e.g., State v. Velazquez, 166 P.3d 91, 105 (Ariz. 2007); Franqui v. State, 804 So. 2d
1185, 1190 (Fla. 2001).
152 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (plurality opinion); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965
(1991) (plurality opinion); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 317 (1983) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
153 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (restricting the ruling to juvenile
offenders only); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010).
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State legislatures often prescribe many and, at times, competing goals for pun-
ishment. Thus, in deciding on a term of imprisonment, a sentencing court may
have to consider the need to protect society; retribution; specific deterrence;
rehabilitation; general deterrence; the need for uniformity of sentencing; and
the need to secure restitution for the victim of a crime.154 Consistent with the
Supreme Court’s case law, states are free to do just that. And what if a state
were to return to the state of affairs prior to the mid-1970s when states aban-
doned rehabilitation in favor of punishment?155 What if a state decided that its
goal of punishment was to “cure” all offenders without regard to their culpabil-
ity? That too seems consistent with the Supreme Court’s case law. Such a sen-
tencing scheme is not hard to imagine: prior to the revitalization of retribution
in the 1970s and 1980s, many states gave judges wide discretion to sentence an
offender;156 in the most extreme systems, a judge might sentence an offender to
as little as one day to life in prison.157 The theoretical justification for such a
system was that an offender gained release when the system rehabilitated
him.158 Were a state to re-impose such a system, unless an offender could make
an argument under the narrow holdings of Harmelin and Ewing, such a sen-
tence would be constitutional.159 Presumably, consistent with Justice Ken-
nedy’s view in Harmelin, such a jurisdiction would be free to pursue its
penological goal of rehabilitation. Similarly, a state like South Dakota would be
free to impose very long prison sentences on repeat offenders like in Solem
unless it sentenced him to a true life sentence.160 Such a sentencing scheme
would be justified by the goal of incapacitating or deterring repeat offenders,
not punishing them according to their just deserts.161
At this point, one begins to see inconsistency between the Court’s death
penalty case law and its proportionality case law when an adult offender is
sentenced to a term of years. As discussed above, cases like Coker v. Georgia
and Kennedy have adopted a retributive principle: unless an offender takes a
life, she is not subject to the death penalty.162 Other cases have further limited
the applicability of the death penalty, for example, to cases where the offender
has a sufficient mens rea163 and a sufficiently important role in the crime to
deserve the ultimate punishment.164 As a result, even if a state believed that the
death penalty could deter other offenders, the Supreme Court case law does not
allow a state to impose the death penalty unless it meets the minimum retribu-
tive goals.
154 CAL. R. CT. 4.410(a).
155 Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (1991).
156 Id. at 1022.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1012.
159 California courts for a time led the nation in limiting such broad discretion and found
many such sentences violated the state constitutional protection against cruel or unusual
punishment. See Vitiello, supra note 94, at 1026.
160 Cf. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
161 Vitiello, supra note 94, at 1057.
162 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599
(1977) (plurality opinion).
163 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987).
164 Id.
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This difference between sentencing in general and the death penalty
invites another question: is the distinction justified? Answering that question
requires more than the rote recitation of the “death is different” line found so
often in justices’ opinions.165
I am not convinced that one can logically distinguish the two situations.
One way to distinguish between the death penalty and terms of imprisonment is
the obvious reality that allowing state prisoners to challenge their terms of
imprisonment on Eighth Amendment grounds opens a floodgate, an administra-
tive nightmare for the federal court system.166 By contrast, far fewer prisoners
are on death row.167 But the Court’s case law dealing with terms of imprison-
ment allows states to choose different penological goals.168 Instead, if the Court
held that states can sentence offenders to prison only when justified by just
deserts, it might also limit federal review to cases where sentences grossly
deviate from some measure of just desert. The Court has not even hinted at
such an approach.
Nor can federalism concerns, at play in the case law governing terms of
imprisonment,169 justify the different treatment of the two areas of the law.
Closely related to the administrative burden argument, the federalism argument
supports Justice Kennedy’s Harmelin position, which allows a great deal of
freedom for states to adopt their own penological purposes for punishment and
leads to fewer cases in which federal courts overrule state judges’ decisions
about a suitable punishment.170 But much the same argument could be made in
the area of the death penalty. Indeed, one might argue, in the area of the death
penalty where passions run higher than in many sentencing cases,171 and where
state practice varies significantly around the country,172 concerns about federal-
ism are even more acute than in criminal sentencing generally. As does the
administrative burden argument, the federalism argument relates more to
pragmatics than it does to principle.
165 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69, (2010) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
187 (1976) (“It is true that a death sentence is ‘unique in its severity and irrevocability.’ ”));
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991) (plurality opinion) (“The penalty of death
differs from all other forms of criminal punishment.”) (internal quotations omitted).
166 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the implications of
Eighth Amendment review by federal courts).
167 In 2009, there were 3,173 inmates on death row in the United States. Death Row Inmates
By State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year. In the same year 140,610 inmates were in
prison for life. Solomon Moore, Number of Life Terms Hits Record, N.Y. TIMES (July 22,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/23sentence.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
168 See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501
U.S. at 998–1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (plurality opinion) (stating the Court’s long deference to state
legislatures); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999–1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining the
federal system’s recognition of the State’s power to make criminal law).
170 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 See, e.g., Charles S. Johnson, Bill Seeking Death Penalty Abolition Inspires Emotional
Testimony, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Feb. 14, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://billingsgazette.com/news
/state-and-regional/montana/bill-seeking-death-penalty-abolition-inspires-emotional-testi
mony/article_66e2d70a-b747-517a-b929-03fbfb18b9b7.html.
172 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (“[W]ithin the United States, there is division over
the . . . applicability of the death penalty among those states that do authorize it.”).
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Another possible argument may be that the need for public safety is satis-
fied if the Supreme Court limits the death penalty because society is protected
through the use of long prison sentences. This ignores the risk that a violent
offender creates to fellow inmates. Perhaps, the ability of the state to place high
risk offenders in maximum security facilities173 reduces that risk. But states’
need to use long terms of imprisonment for public safety are overstated; recent
discussions about alternatives to imprisonment now make that clear.174 Often,
criminal sentences, including mandatory minimum sentences, are mindlessly
long, well beyond the need of the public for protection.175
The previous considerations that may be advanced to support the different
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in the two contexts are pragmatic. A
more principled argument for having different constitutional rules govern the
death penalty and criminal sentencing generally might be that the source of the
two different legal rules is different; thus, the different rules are based on a
policy choice made by Framers of the Eighth Amendment. But that does not
seem to be the case.
Originalists like Justices Scalia and Thomas argue that the Eighth Amend-
ment does not apply to the death penalty176 or the length of a prison sen-
tence.177 Other justices have argued that the application of the death penalty
may violate equal protection.178 But most of the Supreme Court’s death penalty
case law is grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.179 In many of those cases, the Court has indicated that,
instead of rigid adherence to the original understanding of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court looks to evolving standards of decency to determine the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty.180 But the Court’s case law dealing with terms
of imprisonment is also grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unu-
173 An unusual coalition, California Families to Abolish Solitary Confinement, has started
to criticize California’s use of solitary confinement. CFASC, SOLITARY WATCH, http://soli
tarywatch.com/cfasc/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). Given the wide use of solitary confinement
in prisons around the county, see SHARON SHALEV, A SOURCEBOOK ON SOLITARY CONFINE-
MENT 2–3 (2008), available at http://solitaryconfinement.org/uploads/sourcebook_web.pdf,
efforts to eliminate the practice are not likely to succeed.
174
 Michael Vitiello, Alternatives to Incarceration: Why is California Lagging Behind?, 28
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1275, 1285 (2012); Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130812.html).
175 See Vitiello, supra note 174, at 1281. Thus, one might attempt to distinguish the juvenile
offender cases from other term of imprisonment cases by focusing on the impermanence of
youth. We all grow old. But many offenders who were adults when they committed their
offenses also stop committing crime as they age. Hence, for many offenders, criminality is
not permanent.
176 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 993–94 (1991) (plurality opinion).
177 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
178 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249, 255–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 333–35 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
179 CARTER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24 (“The United States Supreme Court has relied heav-
ily on interpretations of the . . . Eighth Amendment[’s provision on cruel and unusual pun-
ishment] to define constitutional capital procedures.”).
180 See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1015 (White, J., dissenting); Furman, 408 U.S. at 242
(Douglas, J., concurring).
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sual punishment provision.181 More recently, Justice Kennedy made clear that
the Court also looks to evolving standards of decency in cases involving terms
of imprisonment.182 And, as developed above, the recent juvenile offender
cases have rejected life without parole for juvenile offenders in large part
because juvenile offenders lack the same level of culpability as adults.183 As a
result, finding a principled explanation for why death penalty cases, in effect,
impose a retributive limitation on the states but prison sentence cases do not
may not be possible.
When one turns to substantive criminal law doctrine, the inconsistency is
at least as jarring. Let me pose the problem again. I read the death penalty cases
and recent juvenile sentencing cases as turning on reduced culpability of the
offenders.184 That is, what makes the various sentences unconstitutional is that
the punishment exceeds the culpability of the offender (either categorically as
to a class of offenders as in cases of retarded killers185 and juvenile offend-
ers;186 or categorically as to a class of crimes as in the cases of rape187 and
child rape;188 or in specific cases where offenders are able to bring in substan-
tial mitigating evidence showing that they lack the necessary level of culpabil-
ity because of genetic or environmental circumstances of their lives189). When
we turn to the substantive criminal law and defenses, does this constitutional
principle carry any weight?
The answer is quite clear: no. In theory, the criminal law is animated by
notions of culpability. For example, the law of homicide can be understood as
based on a graded scale of culpability. Even if premeditation does a bad job of
dividing the most culpable from less culpable murderers,190 the adoption of
degrees of murder was intended to serve as a gate keeper to divide the most
heinous from less heinous offenders.191 Allowing an enraged offender to
reduce his crime from murder to voluntary manslaughter was based on a similar
impulse: at the formal level, an offender who has been provoked does not have
the malice necessary for murder.192 More theoretically, the actor is less culpa-
ble than an actor who acts without similar provocation.193 An offender who
kills through culpable negligence is not treated as harshly as one who kills
intentionally.194 And an offender who killed without fault gets off without pun-
ishment.195 Felony murder is one notable exception where liability falls outside
the carefully graded scale of culpability because an offender may be guilty of
181 See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20–21 (plurality opinion); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 964 (plurality
opinion); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
182 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58–59 (2010).
183 See supra Part III.
184 See supra Part III.
185 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002).
186 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460, 2464 (2012); Graham, 560 U.S. at 69.
187 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
188 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
189 See Denno, supra note 7.
190 See supra Part II.
191 Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 44–45, 55.
192 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 524.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 535.
195 Id. at 208 (explaining justification).
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murder, even murder one, without any mens rea as to the death.196 But of
course, that is why the doctrine is extensively criticized.
Elsewhere, the criminal law demonstrates a similar preference for culpa-
bility. The requirement of a voluntary act is grounded in notions of culpability:
how can we blame someone who did not choose to act?197 The Supreme Court
has observed that the requirement of mens rea “is no provincial or transient
notion.”198 The Model Penal Code drafters debated whether to include criminal
offenses based on negligence.199 Eventually accepting the idea of criminal neg-
ligence, the drafters defined “negligence” as requiring a higher degree of culpa-
bility than ordinary negligence200 and created a presumption that, when a
statute does not include a mens rea term, the prosecution must show that, at a
minimum, the actor committed the act recklessly, i.e., with a subjective aware-
ness of the risk.201 The Code severely limits strict liability and makes it
unavailable if an offender can be sentenced to incarceration.202 Criminal law
commentators are largely critical of strict liability offenses as out of line with
the fundamental concept in the criminal law that culpability matters.203 And
some courts have found that strict liability offenses violate constitutional provi-
sions.204 Courts also tend to read ambiguous statutes as including a mens rea
requirement on the assumption that legislatures did not intend to criminalize
innocent behavior.205
Defenses are often grounded on notions of culpability. Obvious examples
include situations where an offender is justified in doing what otherwise would
be a social harm. Thus, when an offender kills in self-defense or in defense of
another, the offender has made the right choice: protecting an innocent life by
taking the life of a culpable offender, on balance, increases social good.206 But
courts have expanded the law of self-defense and defense of others to cases
where the offender acted under the mistaken belief that his conduct was neces-
sary.207 Depending on whether the killer’s mistake was culpable,208 he may
196 Id. at 510–11. One can find other examples where the criminal law waffles on the role of
culpability in defining crimes and defenses: often, accomplice liability may seem out of
proportion with the offender’s conduct; many states reject diminished capacity, despite the
obvious relevance of such a claim to an offender’s culpability; conspiracy law often sweeps
minor actors into a larger conspiracy than the offender could foresee.
197 Id. at 87.
198 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
199 Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the
Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1439, 1443 (2010).
200 Id. at 1439.
201 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“When the culpability
sufficient [t]o establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such ele-
ment is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect
thereto.”).
202 Id. § 2.05 cmt. 1. (“The method used is not to abrogate strict liability completely, but to
provide that when conviction rests upon that basis the grade of the offense is reduced to a
violation . . . and . . . may result in no sentence other than a fine, or a fine and forfeiture or
other authorized civil penalty.”).
203 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 145, 149–51.
204 Id. at 150.
205 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994).
206 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 255–56.
207 Id. (abandoning the alter-ego rule).
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have a complete defense: thus, an offender who acted under the incorrect belief
the killing force was necessary but who was not negligent in forming that belief
is innocent of the killing.209 Even though he has caused social harm, he was not
culpable and society does not believe punishment is deserved.210
Even excuse defenses are based on a similar view that one who meets
certain requirements lacks sufficient culpability to deserve punishment.211
Society allows an offender to interpose an insanity defense not because the act
was justified, but because society cannot blame the offender for his conduct.212
Hence, the early development of the insanity defense focused on an offender’s
ability to tell right from wrong.213 When legislatures or courts provide an
offender with a defense of duress (when duress is an excuse defense, not a
justification)214 they do so because the decision-maker can understand why the
offender would act as he did. Thus, the Model Penal Code allows a duress
defense when a person of ordinary firmness would act as the defendant did,
even though he created more social harm than he prevented.215 I could offer
additional examples where the criminal law is animated by the culpability
provision.216
The common thread in the criminal law is this: blame is based on the
notion that an offender has a functioning will; as a result, when an offender acts
with a conscious mind, he makes a choice to violate the criminal law and soci-
ety is justified in blaming him for his bad choices.217 When legislatures, courts,
or other policy makers stray from these principles, criminal law scholars are
quick to point out the inconsistency.218
And so, one might conclude that the Supreme Court’s death penalty case
law and recent juvenile punishment case law is consistent with the substantive
area of the criminal law. That is not the case. I offer two examples to demon-
strate the inconsistency, one dealing with the constitutionality of the insanity
defense; the other dealing with a hypothetical case in which a defendant
attempted to introduce behavioral genetic, neuro-scientific, or other evidence
involving the way in which the brain works as a way to counter a claim that the
offender acted in a culpable manner.
208 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“Mistake of Law as to
Unlawfulness of Force or Legality of Arrest; Reckless or Negligent Use of Otherwise Justifi-
able Force; Reckless or Negligent Injury or Risk of Injury to Innocent Persons.”).
209 Id. § 3.09(2) cmt. 2. (“So strongly entrenched is the requirement of reasonable belief
that it has sometimes been imposed in the interpretation of statutes that do not clearly
include it.”).
210 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 249–50.
211 Id. at 207.
212 Id. at 333.
213 Id. at 343–45.
214 Id. at 297.
215 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
216 Commentators often focus on when lawmakers abandon the culpability principle or fail
to follow it consistently. For a far-reaching discussion of this point in connection with liabil-
ity for criminal attempts, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497,
1501–02, 1506–07 (1974).
217 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 117.
218 Id. at 150–51 (explaining the problems with strict liability offenses).
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As discussed above, insanity is a clear example of where the culpability
principle seems to be at work. Thus, the classic formulation of the insanity
defense developed in M’Naghten focuses on the offender’s ability to tell right
from wrong.219 Obviously, we cannot blame someone for acting under the
delusion that he is squeezing a lemon when in fact he is strangling his vic-
tim.220 But the history of the insanity defense highlights the tension between
the assumptions of the criminal law and psychologists and psychiatrists.
The pre-1981 battle between law and science over the insanity defense has
been recounted elsewhere.221 Here is an oversimplified version: probably
aware that many offenders who do not qualify as legally insane under
M’Naghten, nonetheless suffered from such compelling mental illness, courts,
legislatures and policy makers adopted alternatives to the prevailing
M’Naghten test.222 Thus, some courts adopted an irresistible impulse test,
which reflected the view that some actors could not control their conduct.223 As
developed in Judge Bazelon’s opinion in Durham v. United States, an offender
should not be criminalized if his conduct was the product of mental illness.224
While the Model Penal Code drafters did not go as far as did Judge Bazelon, it
adopted a standard more favorable to defendants claiming the insanity defense
than the M’Naghten rule: the Code provides that a person whose conduct is the
result of a mental disease or defect has a defense if he “lacks substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law.”225 The latter provision, the offender’s inability
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, invites greater participa-
tion of psychological and medical experts, who see human behavior in causal
terms, not merely in terms of free will.226 Prior to John Hinckley’s attack on
President Reagan and subsequent trial in which Hinckley was found not guilty
by reason of insanity, the ALI provision seemed headed towards wide accept-
ance nationwide.227
Hinckley’s acquittal produced a significant backlash against the insanity
defense. Many states reacted. Some abandoned the defense outright.228 Others
heightened the defendant’s burden of proof.229 Still others created a new
defense: guilty but mentally ill.230 Typically, the defendant is evaluated and
treated in a hospital but, if cured, the offender finishes out his prison
sentence.231
219 Id. at 343–44.
220 Id. at 344 (relating similar examples).
221 See id. at 343.
222 Id. at 345–46.
223 Id. at 346.
224 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
225 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
226 JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW
609–10 (6th ed. 2012).
227 Id. at 594.
228 See id. at 594, 630.
229 Id. at 594.
230 See id. at 633.
231 See id. at 595.
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Mentally ill offenders appear to be among the least culpable offenders
encountered in the criminal justice system.232 Many mentally ill offenders have
biographies that break one’s heart: they often grow up in horrendous circum-
stances,233 may not have access to meaningful mental health care,234 and may
fall through the cracks, unable to get care even when they seek it out.235 The
mentally ill are more likely to interact with the police than they are with mental
health care professionals.236 While they may not meet the M’Naghten test
because they can give a rote explanation of right and wrong, they may be para-
noid, or otherwise deeply troubled.237 That is, mentally ill offenders seem akin
to juvenile offenders, both groups lacking the ability to conform to ordinary
social norms.
So would a mentally ill offender (even one who could meet the
M’Naghten test) be able to make a successful constitutional challenge if a state
abandoned the insanity defense?
The Supreme Court has left the question open. In Clark v. Arizona, the
Court upheld Arizona’s changes in the law governing its insanity defense.238
The Arizona legislature changed its insanity law, making it more stringent than
even the M’Naghten test.239 The petitioner argued that Arizona violated his due
process, not Eighth Amendment, rights. Specifically, he contended that a state
had to provide, at a minimum, the test from M’Naghten because the M’Naghten
rule is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”240 Recognizing that states and the federal government have
adopted different formulations of the insanity test, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that any one test could be considered fundamental.241 It stated further that
the insanity rule, like the definition of criminal offenses, is left largely within
the discretion of the states.242 But the extent to which the Constitution requires
an insanity defense at all remains an open question. The Court noted that “[w]e
have never held that the Constitution mandates an insanity defense, nor have
we held that the Constitution does not so require. This case does not call upon
us to decide the matter.”243
That question was squarely presented in Delling v. Idaho, a case in which
the petitioner sought certiorari to review whether Idaho violated the Constitu-
232 See generally Michael Vitiello, Addressing the Special Problems of Mentally Ill Prison-
ers: A Small Piece of the Solution to Our Nation’s Prison Crisis, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 57
(2010) (identifying how mentally ill prisoners engage the criminal justice system).
233 See id. at 63 (describing the homeless and self-medicating mentally ill).
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 63, 66.
237 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 345–46.
238 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 756 (2006).
239 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502 (2013) (granting the insanity defense only if the defen-
dant “did not know the criminal act was wrong”).
240 Clark, 548 U.S. at 748 (internal quotations omitted).
241 Id. at 749–51.
242 Id. at 752.
243 Id. at 752 n.20. Meanwhile, courts in states that have abandoned the insanity defense
have rejected constitutional challenges to the law abandoning the defense. DRESSLER, supra
note 40, at 357.
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tion when it abrogated the insanity defense.244 But the Court denied the petition
for review.245
Courts in states that have abandoned the insanity offense have upheld
those laws as constitutional.246 Defendants have contended that the laws violate
the offenders’ due process rights247 and the prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.248 But as Professor Joshua Dressler has observed,
[s]ince the federal Due Process Clause does not prohibit a legislature from aban-
doning the basic requirement of mens rea, it would seem to follow that a state may
take the less dramatic approach of retaining the element of mens rea, while repealing
the defense of insanity, as long as the prosecution is required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite mental state.249
Perhaps, then, a defendant could argue in favor of a constitutional right to
introduce psychological evidence reducing his culpability as a way to negate
his mens rea.
Clark also discussed the general rule that an offender has a due process
right to present a defense and to introduce evidence in support of that
defense.250 As such, an offender is entitled to introduce evidence that tends to
negate his mens rea.251 Thus, one might argue that a defendant has a right to
introduce behavioral genetic, neuro-scientific, and other evidence relating to
the workings of the brain to negate mens rea evidence. But whether such a
claim would succeed is uncertain.
In Clark, the Court recognized that evidence of an offender’s mental dis-
ease sufficient to show that he could not form the necessary mens rea is rele-
vant to negate the required mens rea.252 But it rejected the petitioner’s claim
that his right was violated. Instead, as the Court observed, trial courts have
broad discretion to disallow relevant evidence.253 Thus, a court may exclude
evidence when the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighs its probative
value.254 Further, at trial, the petitioner was allowed to introduce observational
evidence of his mental illness. That is, lay witnesses testified about his behavior
at home and with friends.255 Witnesses were able to testify about the peti-
tioner’s statements that aliens inhabited his body.256 That kind of evidence
could be presented by experts as well as lay witnesses.257 But the Court left the
States a good bit of latitude in excluding expert evidence on mental illness
when it observed that some categories of mental illness are controversial, that
244 Delling v. Idaho, 133 S. Ct. 504, 506 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 504.
246 See, e.g., State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372, 1378–79 (Utah 1996); State v. Herrera, 895
P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 1995); State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 918–19 (Idaho 1990); State v.
Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1001 (Mont. 1984).
247 See, e.g., Clark, 548 U.S. at 756; Korell, 690 P.2d at 998–99.
248 See, e.g., Korell, 690 P.2d at 1001.
249 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 358 (footnotes omitted).
250 Clark, 548 U.S. at 755–56.
251 Id. at 756–57.
252 Id. at 776.
253 Id. at 769–71.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 745, 756–57.
256 Id. at 745.
257 Id. at 757–58.
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some mental-disease evidence may mislead, and that expert testimony creates a
danger of creating greater certainty about an offender’s lack of capacity than is
warranted.258 As a result, at least where the state allowed the petitioner to intro-
duce evidence of mental disease on the issue of insanity, the state did not vio-
late the petitioner’s due process right by disallowing the evidence on mens
rea.259 The expert evidence created too great a risk of misleading the jury.260
Implicit in some of the discussion in Clark is the fact that expert evidence
on mental illness may be irrelevant on the mens rea question as well.261 That is
so because an offender may suffer from a mental disease and yet be able to
form an intent to commit the underlying crime. An offender who is not delu-
sional may know that killing is wrong and that he is killing. That is, Clark
argued that the state had to provide the traditional M’Naghten defense, not a
more scientifically based insanity defense like the Model Penal Code approach.
If that is the case, he has the mens rea. Evidence of his genetic or psychological
condition may not negate the mens rea at all. While behavioral genetic evi-
dence or other evidence about the offender’s psyche may reduce his culpability,
it does not contradict the fact that his mind formed the intent to kill. Thus,
Clark seemingly allows the state to exclude the evidence.262 And this point
takes me back full circle to the hypothetical defendant Mr. Esaltato.263
When Mr. Esaltato faces criminal charges, he tells his attorney, “I got
dealt a bad disposition. That was not my fault. And now your experts examined
me and have studied my culture. They agree that I have a much harder time
controlling myself than ordinary people. Holding me to that standard is not
fair.” New evidence about the way the brain works confirms Mr. Esaltato’s
insight into his own psyche. But in many ways, the kind of evidence he seeks to
rely on is in direct conflict with a fundamental principle of the criminal law.
Today, the science of the brain is more advanced than in the past but the debate
is the same as has been carried on for some time: the medical model of human
behavior looks for causes; the criminal law is premised on the assumption that
a person acting with awareness has the free will to choose how to behave.264
Because the free will principle is foundational, I would not expect courts or
legislatures to allow liberal use of brain evidence any time in the foreseeable
future, no matter how much that evidence suggests that an offender may have
reduced culpability.
At least, the free will model is the foundational idea in the criminal law
when the issue is not the availability of the death penalty. As developed above,
if Mr. Esaltato was charged with capital murder, he could introduce the same
evidence that may be inadmissible in his trial for non-capital murder.265
258 Id. at 774.
259 Id. at 776.
260 Id. at 776, 778.
261 Id. at 776–77.
262 Id. at 778–79.
263 See supra Part IV.
264 DRESSLER, supra note 40, at 334, 342–43 (examining the divide between the medical
and legal definitions of insanity).
265 See supra Part IV.
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Above, I argued that the distinction between the death penalty cases and
sentencing cases may be explained on pragmatic, not principled, grounds. That
is equally true when one compares the death penalty cases and the case law
giving states broad latitude in defining criminal law offenses and defenses.266
V. CONCLUSION
As developed above, modern science relating to the way the brain works
has increasing importance in death penalty cases.267 Even more recently, the
Supreme Court has relied on that body of evidence in cases involving punish-
ment for juveniles.268 The emerging principle is that such evidence demon-
strates that individual offenders or categories of offenders are not fully culpable
for their conduct.269 And that principle is grounded in the Constitution.270
But when one explores whether such a principle may require courts to
admit such evidence outside the confines of the death penalty and juvenile
offender cases, the argument seems to flounder.271 Either the Supreme Court
has rejected such an argument272 or seemingly would do so.273 This different
approach seems at best pragmatic and not principled.274
Is this inconsistency within the criminal law intolerable? That is the sub-
ject of another, much longer discussion. Suffice it to say that even under the
most ideal circumstances for reform, coherence in the criminal law is likely to
be elusive.275 As someone largely opposed to the death penalty,276 I hesitate to
criticize the inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s case law. By incorporating a
retributivist just desert principle into the Eighth Amendment, cases like Coker
and Kennedy cabin the death penalty.277 That may be a good enough explana-
tion for why the Court tolerates the inconsistency.278 For proponents of behav-
ioral genetic evidence and other evidence relating to human behavior, the
message may be that their efforts to expand areas in which such evidence is
relevant may have hit a wall.
266 Further, it is not enough to say that society has a need to incapacitate someone like Mr.
Esaltato because of his short fuse. See supra Part II (stating that the retributivist theories of
punishment require the punishment be proportional to the crime).
267 See supra Part II.
268 See supra Part III.
269 See supra Part IV.
270 See supra Part IV.
271 See supra Part IV.
272 See supra Part IV.
273 See supra Part IV.
274 See supra Part IV.
275 See Vitiello, supra note 199, at 1441.
276 See generally Michael Vitiello, Personal Reflections on Connick v. Thompson, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON CRIM. L. 217 (2013) (using Thompson to discuss the author’s opposition to the
death penalty).
277 See text accompanying notes 97–99, 162.
278 See Bricker & Vitiello, supra note 2, at 44–46.
